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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
West Virginia decision in support of its holding. However, the
court does cite four cases from other jurisdictions which, are
squarely in point and which set forth the requirement of the hearsay declarant's knowledge qualifications in unequivocal terms.9
A closely analogous situation exists in the case of dying
declarations -another
exception to the hearsay rule.1 The West
Virginia court has said that hearsay statements sought to be admitted under this exception must be such as would be admissible
if the declarant were in court testifying."' The requirement thus
laid down would seem to be applicable, by analogy, to the so-called
res gestae exception."

V. V. C.
MuN

IcPAL CORPORATIONS -

EXTRA-TERRITORIAL

POWERS

-

AUTHORITY TO BUnIu SEWAGE DISPosAL PLANT OUTSIDE THEM STATE.

a recent West Virginia case the Supreme Court of Appeals
held that a municipality had the power to acquire property and
erect a sewage disposal plant in an adjoining state. Bernard v. City
-In

of Bluefield.'
The court cited as authority for its holding the only two
similar decisions2 among the few cases raising the problem of the
extra-territorial exercise of powers by municipalities outside the
state of their creation.
quirement [of knowledge qualificationsJ is in practice usually fulfilled ...
Nevertheless, in an appropriate case, it would without doubt be enforced.
... ."
See Isa 1 GREENLEAP, EVIDENCE § 114a.
Woodrum Home Outfitting Co. v. Adams Express Co., 90 W. Va. 161, 165,
110 S. E.549 (1922) appears to be a holding on the point.
9 Hines v. Patterson, 146 Ark. 367, 225 S. W. 642 (1920); Crawford v.
CharlestofA-Isle of Palms Traction Co., 126 S. C. 447, 120 S. E. 381 (1923);
Kumke v. Best Kid Co., 244 Pa. 126, 90 Ati. 538 (1914); Wenquist v. Omaha
& C. B. St. Ry.Co., 97 Neb. 554, 150 N. W. 637 (1914). Hines v. Patterson,
supra,is substantially similar to the principal case. The court held the statement inadmissible as part of the res gestac because "There was no showing
that the bystander saw appellee faint or that he was present at the time of the
occurrence. For aught that appears, he may have received the information
.... from thers." Id. at 376.
20 See 3 WiGMORE, EVmENCE §§ 1430-1452.
11 See State v. Hood, 63 W. Va. 182, 185, 59 S. E. 971 (1907) ; State v. Burnett, 47W . Va. 731, 737, 35 S.E. 983 (1900), wherein the rule is set forth in a
dictum cited in State v. Hood, supra. See also 3 WIGMOmE, EVMENCE § 1445;
4 ELLIOTT, EVIDENCE (1905) § 3033.
12 See n. 5.
1186 S. E. 298 (W. Va. 1936).
2 Langdon v. City of Walla Walla, 112 Wash. 4462 193 Pac. 1 (1920);
Superior Water, Light & Power Co. v. City of Superior, 174 Wis. 257, 181 N.
W. 113; id, 176 Wis. 627, 183 N. W. 254 (1922).
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The rationale of these cases is that while any attempt by a
state to extend its territorial sovereignty into another state would
be futile, a distinction exists in the functions of a municipal corporation which will permit the result achieved in these decisions.
The division of municipal powers into governmental and proprietary functions is established and well recognized,3 and the
theory is that in the exercise of its proprietary functions a municipality is regarded as having the rights and liabilities of a private
corporation 4 and in acquiring property for the establishment of a
proprietary enterprise in another state the municipality is not attempting to extend its territorial sovereignty but stands in the
same position as would a foreign corporation operating in that
state.5
Though the West *Virginia court cited these two cases with
approval, it did not adopt their reasoning as the basis for its decision. Instead, it preferred to place its decision on the basis of
"necessity or impelling convenience".
Thus it would seem that the court has both broadened and
limited the rule of these two cases; broadening it by allowing a
municipality, in the case of necessity, to acquire property in an
adjoining state, even in the exercise of a function generally held
governmental ;6 limiting it by refusing to allow a city to act outside of the state even in the exercise of a proprietary function
unless necessity is shown.
The only objection to a municipality's acting in another state
is that the city is thus attempting to extend its territorial sovereign3 DILLoN, MUNIcIPAL CORPORATIONS

(5th ed. 1911) §§ 97, 109, 110, 122n,

1638-1646; MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1928) § 1946n.
4 DLLON, op. cit. supra n. 3, § 109.
"...
and as to such powers (pro-

prietary) and to property acquired thereunder and contracts made thereunder", the corporation is regarded as having the rights and obligations of a
private rather than those of a public corporation. Chrysler Light & Power Co.
v. City of Belfield, 58 N. Dak. 33, 224 N. W. 871 (1929); Winona v. Botzet,
169 Fed. 321 (1896).
5 Langdon v. City of Walla Walla, 112 Wash. 446, 193 Pac. 1 (1920);
Superior Water, Light & Power Co. v. City of Superior, 174 Wis. 257, 181 N.

W. 113 (1921).
e That in arranging for the collection and disposition of sewage a minic-

ipality is acting under its police or governmental power to protect the public
health, see Stifel v. Hannan, 95 W. Va. 629, 123 S. E. 428 (1924) ; McQUmLLAN,
op. cit. supra n. 3, §§ 935-948. Following the trend to abolish governmental
immunity in tort, however, scattered cases will be found holding that in the
construction and maintenance of sewers a city is acting in its "proprietary"
or "private" or "ministerial" function, in order to establish liability. See
Ostrander v. Lansing, 11 Mich. 693, 70 N. W. 332 (1897); Detroit v. Corey, 9
Mich. 165 (1862); Donahoe v. Kansas City, 136 Mo. 657, 3.8 S. W. 571 (1897).
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ty into that state. But the mere acquisition of property, construction and operation of a plant, whether in carrying out a governmental or proprietary function, does not of itself interfere with
that sovereignty. It is suggested, therefore, that the court, in the
instant case, applies a better criterion.
F. P .C.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE

-

SPLITTING A CAUSE OF ACTION ON

INJUNCTION BoNDs.-The plaintiff sues on one of two injunction
bonds which were executed by the principal defendant with different sureties. In a prior suit the plaintiff recovered the full penalty
of one of the bonds, placing in issue all its items of damages, which.
greatly exceeded the penalty of the bond. The conditions of the
two bonds were identical and the same items of damages were
tendered in each suit. Held, that the plaintiff's recovery on one of
these bonds precludes his right to a judgment on the other, he having
litigated all his items of damagesin the prior action. State v. Covtinental Coal Co.'
These statutory 2 bonds were executed as a condition precedent
to the taking effect of a preliminary injunction 3 purporting to
save harmless the defendant enjoined, from any damages incurred
by reason of the injunction in case of its dissolution. 4 In the
absence of these bonds there is no common-law liability for such
damages unless the injunction was applied for maliciously or
without probable cause,' and it is suggested that the statute providing for the execution of sueh bonds does not create any extrinsic
liability. It would seem that in the absence of any such extrinsic
liability the defendant could be liable only upon the bonds, a
separate cause of action accruing on each by the breach of the
condition thereof.6 A person having several causes of action
1186 S. E 119 (W. Va. 1936).
2 W. VA. Rv. CODE (1931) c. 53, art. 5, § 9.
3 Conley v. Brewer, 85 W. Va. 725, 102 S. E. 607 (1920); Meyers v. Land
Co., 107 W. Va. 632, 149 S. E. 819 (1929).
4 See Meyers v. Land Co., 107 W. Va. 632, 643, 149 S. E. 819 (1929).
5 Glen Jean R. Co. v. Kanawha R. Co., 47 W. Va. 725, 35 S. E. 978 (1900);
Notes (1926) 45 A. L. R. 1517; L. R. A. 1916E, 1282; (1916) 14 R. C. L.
479. See State v. Marguerite Coal Co., 104 W. Va. 324, 326, 140 S. E. 49
(1927). In Gorton v. Brown, 27 Ill. 488 (1862) the court held where a bond
was required the remedy on the bond was exclusive even though the injunction
was obtained maliciously and without probable cause.
6 Courts have apparently assumed that the breach of the condition of a bond
gives rise to a cause of action. Roach v. Gardner, 9 Grat. 89 (Va. 1852);
Chicago R. Co. v. Cimarron, 68 Okla. 7, 170 Pae. 909 (1917); White v. Clay's
Ex'rs, 7 Leigh 68, 81 (Va. 1836); State v. Pingley, 84 W. Va. 433, 100 S. E.
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